By M .Hanif Ismail
Amphibious warfare is inherently a joint operation; at the
most basic form, it requires ships to transport troops from ship to shore where
they can establish a beachhead and execute a normal ground campaign from there.
For many armed forces around the world, it is the business of the Navy to
operate ships; as such ships for the amphibious warfare will be maintained and
manned by the Navy.
Although troops fulfilling the function of a Marine Corps
historically come from the Navy as well, it does not have to be the case (for
example, Guards battalions tasked with amphibious operations are under the
Singapore Army, not Navy).
It has been established in Part II that the intention behind
the establishment of the Marine Corps is important in order to determine which
model suit it best.
If the intent is for power projection then a number of big
ticket items are needed: trained troops for the amphibious landing, sufficient
troop lift capability, ability to provide air cover in transit and during the
amphibious landing, ability to protect the amphibious warfare ships in transit
and during the amphibious landing and specialised craft to transport ship to
shore.
If the intent is to setup a rapidly deployable force for
handling domestic situations, most of the requirements above can be waived, as
technically the Marine Corps will be the same as an Army unit, and can be
transported by trucks instead of ships for most domestic situations.
Here we will take a look at what resources we currently have
to form the base of the new Marine Corps.
CURRENTLY AVAILABLE RESOURCES
TRAINED TROOPS: Currently all the commandos and Special
Forces formations (21 Gerup Gerak Khas / 21 GGK of the Malaysian Army, PASKAL
of the Navy and PASKAU of the Air Force) are trained and can be deployed for
small scale amphibious operations / raids, as well as to be part of larger
amphibious landings. Also trained in amphibious operations is the 10 Para
Brigade (in particular the 9th Royal Malay Regiment / 9 RMR, one of the
airborne infantry battalion under the Brigade). 10 Para Brigade is the main
element of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The amphibious operation capabilities
of these formations have been demonstrated in joint / joint combined exercises
such as EKS BELANGKAS, EKS ANGSA, EKS MALINDO DARSASA and EKS CARAT/PENYU
TRIDENT).
Elements of 21 GGK and PASKAL are trained in beach
reconnaissance and obstacle clearing for landing zone preparation, which are essential
for a successful amphibious landing.
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS: Currently we have 2 amphibious
warfare ships, KD Mahawangsa and KD Sri Indera Sakti, each can transport
about 600 troops. These ships are not suitable in the long run as it is not
equipped with well deck to allow the loading of landing craft from the interior
vehicle lanes.
SPECIALISED CRAFT: Assault boats with outboard engines are currently
used in amphibious operation exercises. These are not exactly the most ideal
craft for large scale amphibious operations as it cannot carry vehicles and can
only transport about a dozen troops each.
AIR COVER: Boeing F/A-18D and Sukhoi Su-30MKM from the Air
Force are able and can be tasked to provide air cover and close air support.
MARITIME PROTECTION: The 2 Lekiu-class multi role frigates can be tasked to protect the
amphibious warfare ships in transit and during the amphibious landing.
Additional 2 Kasturi-class light
frigates and 4 Laksamana-class
corvettes can also be tasked as needed.
Part V will look at the requirements for a tactically mobile
Marine Corps as well as for a strategically mobile, power projection-capable
Marine Corps.
I would propose that Malaysia look at the marine forces of the Scandanavian countries as a possible model. These are littoral forces with no/limited power projection capabilities but strong in defensive firepower.
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