By M .Hanif Ismail
Amphibious warfare is inherently a joint operation; at the
most basic form, it requires ships to transport troops from ship to shore where
they can establish a beachhead and execute a normal ground campaign from there.
For many armed forces around the world, it is the business of the Navy to
operate ships; as such ships for the amphibious warfare will be maintained and
manned by the Navy.
Although troops fulfilling the function of a Marine Corps
historically come from the Navy as well, it does not have to be the case (for
example, Guards battalions tasked with amphibious operations are under the
Singapore Army, not Navy).
It has been established in Part II that the intention behind
the establishment of the Marine Corps is important in order to determine which
model suit it best.
If the intent is for power projection then a number of big
ticket items are needed: trained troops for the amphibious landing, sufficient
troop lift capability, ability to provide air cover in transit and during the
amphibious landing, ability to protect the amphibious warfare ships in transit
and during the amphibious landing and specialised craft to transport ship to
shore.
If the intent is to setup a rapidly deployable force for
handling domestic situations, most of the requirements above can be waived, as
technically the Marine Corps will be the same as an Army unit, and can be
transported by trucks instead of ships for most domestic situations.
Here we will take a look at what resources we currently have
to form the base of the new Marine Corps.